| CVE | CVE-2024-26670 |
| CVE Title | |
| Published Date | 2024-04-02T07:15Z |
| Modified Date | 2024-04-02T12:50Z |
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD Currently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn't quite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit memory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR. The ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to handle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295, which are described in: * https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en * https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en In both cases the workaround is described as: | If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the | kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected | cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses: | | 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including | unused contexts or addresses, such as a `TLBI VALE1 Xzr`. | | 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI. The important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed "after all explicit memory accesses". Unfortunately, as-implemented, the TLBI+DSB is immediately followed by an LDR, as we have: | alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD | tlbi vale1, xzr | dsb nsh | alternative_else_nop_endif | alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 | ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] | add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp | eret | alternative_else_nop_endif | | [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ] This patch fixes this by reworking the logic to place the TLBI+DSB immediately before the ERET, after all explicit memory accesses. The ERET is currently in a separate alternative block, and alternatives cannot be nested. To account for this, the alternative block for ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is replaced with a single alternative branch to skip the KPTI logic, with the new shape of the logic being: | alternative_insn "b .L_skip_tramp_exit_@", nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 | [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ] | .L_skip_tramp_exit_@: | | ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] | add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp | | alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD | tlbi vale1, xzr | dsb nsh | alternative_else_nop_endif | eret The new structure means that the workaround is only applied when KPTI is not in use; this is fine as noted in the documented implications of the erratum: | Pagetable isolation between EL0 and higher level ELs prevents the | issue from occurring. ... and as per the workaround description quoted above, the workaround is only necessary "If pagetable isolation is disabled". |
| References | |
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| Reference URL | https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58eb5c07f41704464b9acc09ab0707b6769db6c0 |
| Reference Description | https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58eb5c07f41704464b9acc09ab0707b6769db6c0 |
| Reference URL | https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/baa0aaac16432019651e0d60c41cd34a0c3c3477 |
| Reference Description | https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/baa0aaac16432019651e0d60c41cd34a0c3c3477 |
| Reference URL | https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/832dd634bd1b4e3bbe9f10b9c9ba5db6f6f2b97f |
| Reference Description | https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/832dd634bd1b4e3bbe9f10b9c9ba5db6f6f2b97f |
| Sources | NIST MITRE |
Note
- No CVSS data for this CVE